Ukraine is the best example of "nationalizing" nationalism. During its twenty-five year old existence the language question -in addition to historical approach and ethnical identity -has belonged to the unclosed questions of personal and group identity, and represents one of the central themes of political struggle. Official Ukrainian language policy permanently wants to promote the use of Ukrainian or Russian by overshadowing one or the other. Measures regulating language use have never been consequently applied, which fact in itself is enough to represent a permanent subject for political campaigns. Political powers unable to solve actual economic and social problems wanted to distract attention by this means. That is why the politicized language question could contribute to the political crisis and the outbreak of the armed conflict at the end of 2013 and at the beginning of 2014 in a politically unstable country facing economic breakdown. The present paper examines the role of the language question in the Ukrainian crisis in the period of 2014-2016. 
for two years (due to the sanctions and opposing sanctions) is obstructing the economic growth that could be barely reconstructed after the 2008 economic crisis, not only in Ukraine but all over the world. Ukrainian GDP significantly reduced in 2014 and 2015, the country lost 21 % of its industrial capacity. 7 • Constitutional crisis. Through 5 years until 1996 the country functioned based on the scant constitution of Soviet-Ukraine, and the Constitution that was accepted after numerous political struggles has been rewritten several times since then. Up to 2014 the most important modifications reflected the polemics on presidential power. After the second Maidan one of the basic promises of the new ruling power was decentralization -this way trying to solve the Donbass conflict as well. 8 Up to now three international documents were signed to solve the situation: the Minsk 1 9 and the Minsk Memorandum 10 in 2014, and the Minsk 2 Agreement in 2015. 11 The most important issue of the Minsk 2 Agreement was the "constitutional reform" to be performed by the end of 2015, granting decentralization, the representatives of the Donbass separatists should be involved. The draft on the issue of decentralization was made ready, but on August 31, 2015 the crowd protesting against its acceptance in front of the parliament began rioting, which forced the parliament to adjourn the modification of the law without date.
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• Political crises. The poor economic state, constitutional problems were the reasons and also consequences of internal political crises. The best verification of these crises is the fact that during the 25-year existence of the state, it had to face the emptying of the institution of the referendum, several early elections (head of state in 1994 and in 2014, parliamentary elections in 1994, 2007 and 2014) , and two revolutions (the Orange revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014).
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• Demographic crisis. During the 1989 census (still as a member of the Soviet Union) the population of the Ukrainian SSR was 51.45 million people. The highest number was 52.2 million inhabitants in 1993. During the 2001 census which was the first but also the last census of the independent Ukraine this number decreased to 48.24 million, in 2013 it was about 45 million, while in early 2016 the officially estimated number dcat' let obščestvennych izmeněnij v Ukraině], Kiev 2011, 441.
7 Online: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp (Dowloaded 22 April 2017).
8 MARLIN, Marguerite: Concepts of "Decentralization" and "Federalization" in Ukraine: Political Signifiers or Distinct Constitutionalist Approaches for Devolutionary Federalism?, in: Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 22, 2016, 3, 278-299. 
Nation and Language
Kulyk sees the language an important marker of Ukrainian identity which, due to a lack of independent statehood, has been ethnic rather than civic. The contradictory policies of the Soviet regime produced a large discrepancy between ethnocultural identity and language use. In the independent Ukraine this discrepancy persisted, as increased identification with the Ukrainian nation was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the use of the Ukrainian language.
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One of the basic objectives of the emerging pursuit of independence in the Soviet Empire was to make the national languages -giving the names of the republics -state languages. In 1988-1990 the supreme councils (parliaments) of the federal republics passed their language laws, which legally decided their national languages as state languages. Lan-guage laws were soon followed by declarations of independence. This way the question of language got the focus of struggle for political independence and national identity. 20 In Ukraine bearing the features of both bilingualism and multilingualism the struggle has still been fierce in the recent twenty-five years. In Ukraine the number of persons considering themselves Ukrainian nationals (nearly 78 %) is much higher than those who consider the Ukrainian state language their mother tongue/ first language (less than 68 %). The number of citizens considering Russian as their mother tongue/first language (nearly 30 %) is much higher than those who consider themselves Russian nationals (17.3 %). Nearly quarter (22.18 %) of the total population consider themselves belonging to national minorities. However, practically every third person (32.47 %) belongs to one or another linguistic minority from a linguistic point of view, as Ukrainian and Russian speakers represent 97.12 % of the total Ukrainian population. National minorities preserving their mother tongues -Bulgarians, Rumanians, Moldovans, Hungarians and the Gagauz -live mainly in blocks, usually in peripheral regions of Ukraine (Transcarpathia, Northern Bukovina, Southern Bessarabia), which were joined to the Soviet Union due to border changes following the second world war. There are altogether four languagesRussian, Crimean Tatar, Rumanian and Hungarian -whose speakers represent more than 10 % of the population of the given region.
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Similar to several other soviet republics, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic passed the law on the languages of the Ukrainian SSR -one of the first laws pursuing independence -as early as in October 1989. 22 th Articles). However, negative trends concerning language politics could be seen soon after the successful independence referendum (December 1, 1991) and the international recognition of Ukraine as an independent state. Concerning linguistic rights, the 1992 law on national minorities 23 strengthened the already existing rights to mother tongue education, at the same time the possibility of official language use still depended on the majority of the given national minority inside the given administrative unit (8 th Article). The acceptance of The Ukrainian Constitution in June 1996 did not brought essential changes concerning the codification of linguistic rights -except for the limitation of the 20 JAVORSKAJA, Galyna: Языковые конфликты и языковые идеологии в Молдове (на материале анализа фо-кус-групп) [Jazykovye konflikty i jazykovye iděologii v Moldove (na matěriale analiza fokus-grupp)], in: Studia Linguistika, 2011, 5, 350-351. 21 Online: http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017); CSERNICS-KÓ, István -FERENC, Viktória: Transitions in the language policy of Ukraine (1989 Ukraine ( -2014 possibilities of Russian: it was no longer defined as the language of international communication -Russian became not more than one of the national minority languages. Those struggling for exclusive Ukrainian monolingualism considered it their victory, while those fighting for the acceptance of Russian as the second official language or a nationally accepted auxiliary language considered it was their defeat. Ukraine joined the Council of Europe in 1996, but it did not bring about changes concerning the use of mother tongue. The process of the Ukrainian ratification of The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was complicated, the obligations of the standard text prescribe less than language rights already existing in Ukraine, do not support national minorities willing to preserve their existing positions, while their rights may be curtailed with reference to the Charter.
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After the millennium several laws and other lower rank measures were passed which had negative influence on non-state-language speakers. The 2001 year amendment of the law on parliamentary elections did no longer include the possibility of making ballots available in minority languages. In this period language use regulations were generally amended in favour of the Ukrainian language in several fields. Previously the prescriptions defining the language of the creation, announcement, application etc. of the documents of the different measures (concerning tax, finance, insurance, medicine, elections, food quality, etc.) fell within the competence of the language law, after 2000 each legal rule ordained the exclusive use of the state language. This trend became even stronger after the Orange revolution. Some examples of linguistic equality and inequality from the period: extra duty was imposed on non-Ukrainian publications; from 2008 only Ukrainian language broadcasters could apply for the operation of radio and TV channels; cinemas were allowed to show only Ukrainian-speaking, synchronized or subtitled films. Education reform should also be mentioned here, as the possibilities of mother-tongue education became limited. Advanced maturity exams -which meant the entrance examinations to higher education as well -had to be taken at independent regional examination centres, in test-system and only in Ukrainian. In addition the Ukrainian language and literature exam became compulsory, the questions of the tests were compiled according to the education program of Ukrainian language schools.
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The politically prejudicial situation of minorities was changed by the new language law -"On the principles of the state language policy" -passed in 2012. 26 The 2012 language law broke off with the declarative framework regulation -traditional in post-soviet regions. Following the spirituality and text of the Language Charter it defined exact rules and cri-teria for the addressees of the rights, the concerned geographical areas, the conditions of the use and mechanism of the standard rules and the duties of the executive powers. The law contains among others the exact and clear definition of the language of national minorities (1 st article) and the list of (altogether 18) languages considered regional or minority languages in Ukraine -including Rusyn, which is officially not recognized as an independent language. The listed languages are: Russian, Belarussian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldovian, German, Modern Greek, Polish, Roma, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Rusyn, Karaim, Krymchak. According to the law the use of the above regional languages is compulsory or possible in case the number of the speakers of the given language is at least 10 % of the inhabitants in the given administrative unit (7 th article, 3rd §).
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Expert opinions protesting against the 2012 language law fear the "Byelorussian way." In the neighbouring country (Byelorussia) actually less than 5 % of the population use the Byelorussian language, which threatens not only the language but also the existence of the Byelorussian nation. "Mother-tongueness" and "language use" should be differentiated, in this respect the European Language Charter -when protecting Russian in Ukraine -supports a language used also by persons identifying themselves as Ukrainian -a great number of these people exclusively use Russian. This situation threatens the Ukrainian language and the existence of the Ukrainian nation. The threat is strengthened by the fact that the law was introduced by representatives of Russian cultural circles. 28 Positioning regional languages makes it unnecessary to learn Ukrainian, which is even more possible as a great number of the population do not speak the state language, and the situation is not likely to change under these conditions. We can see the hardly implicite "inverse" standpoint according to which minority languages threaten the state language unless it can perform its basic function.
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Language as a Casus Belli
In the late autumn of 2013 -before and after series of political and economic crises -riots broke out in Kyiv that claimed several lives, in March 2014 Russia annexed the Crimea, and the war which is officially called "antiterrorist operation" (ATO) has been lasting since April 2014 at the eastern edges of the country. The Ukrainian-Russian position battle and the unsettled language policy plays a key role in the obstruction of the economic growth of the narrower and wider area, threatening the safety of the whole European continent. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union millions of the members of the Russian com-27 CSERNICSKÓ, István -FEDINEC, Csilla: Four Language Laws of Ukraine, in: International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 23, 2016, 4, 560- 30 But de facto, these positive economic, political and cultural positions could be saved after the state change. 31 In this already problematic, tense political situation the fact that the new state organizing ethnic group (Ukrainian) claimed all the treasured positions of the Russian community is the main cause of the conflict. The conflict between the two dominant ethnic groups broke out because of the functions of the Ukrainian and Russian language. As a result, a paradoxical situation has risen in the language situation and the judgement of the state language policy of the minorities (amongst them the loudest are Russian-speaking) are dissatisfied with their guaranteed language rights, while the majority of the elite is worried about the current status and future of the Ukrainian language. 32 Korostelina sees the struggle between languages and identities as a zero-sum game that makes compromise impossible.
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The political elite divided into two parts used the mobilizing force of the language in all of the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns in the history of independent Ukraine. In the country's northern and western parts the population (where mainly Ukrainian-speaking people live) were threatened by the politicians, that if Russian becomes a second state language in Ukraine it would seal the fate of an independent Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation. A significantly Russian-speaking population of the eastern and southern regions, in contrast tried to encourage voters that the status of their language, the Russian will be regularized and that it will not be superseded from everyday life by the ukrainizing political elite. The activity around the language issue especially increased as the 2012 parliamentary elections were approaching. In 2010, only 2.43 %, and in 2011 less than 1.80 % of the political movements were related to the language situation, in 2012 this proportion rose to 10.45 %. 34 An indicator of how interested are the politicians in keeping the language problem in the agenda is that in 2011 (when there were no elections in Ukraine) in 46 % of the movements affecting the language issue were involved parties or other political actors; in the two election years (2010 and 2012), however, this ratio was 64 % and 66 %. 35 In 2012, 92 % of the 380 political movements related to the language issue were in defense of the Ukrainian language, against raising the status of Russian language. Language Act. After being defeated in the 2004 Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election, the President and the Party of Regions behind himaccording to election promises -he intended to base language policy on the real situation. They wanted to codify the country's de facto bilingualism by raising Russian into a second state language status. The central part of their argument was that violent nationalism threatens linguistic and ethnic rights of the Russian-speaking population, it overshadows the Russian language and culture. 37 However, the right of free use of the Russian language was demanded not only in the southern and eastern regions, but also across the country, also in areas where the proportion of the Russian-speaking population is insignificant. The new power -ignoring the protest actions -began to rewrite the Constitution and the Language Act. They did not have the political power for the amendment of the Constitution: they did not get two-thirds of the votes in the Parliament. However, the 1989 language law from the Soviet times in 2012 has been replaced after scandalous and unworthy parliamentary scenes and political games.
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The language law had a number of opponents. The Constitutional Court was repeatedly asked to declare it unconstitutional, organizing several protests in the streets. The language issue was not reassuring. On 21 November 2013, it became apparent that the president of Ukraine -a country heading towards state bankruptcy at the time -was not going to sign the free trade agreement or the association agreement with the European Union in Vilnius. The Ukrainian government opted for the very favourable Russian loan rather than the IMF loan, which would have brought unpopular and strict austerity measures threatening its power. On 23 November protests for Ukraine's European integration started in Kyiv. 39 The protests organized in the city's main square 40 were peaceful for a while and were called the Revolution of Dignity. On November 30 an unreasonably brutal use of force by the police propelled the lukewarm protests into a national movement. The parliamentary majority backing the president modified several laws on 16 January 2014, in order to limit people's right of assembly. This triggered the protests to escalate to uncontrolled violence which resulted in many casualties (are remembered as "Heaven's Hundred Heroes") as well. The parliament repealed the laws of January 16 on January 28, 41 and on February 22 president Yanukovych fled the country. A quick realignment occurred in the parliament. Representing different parties than before, the same members of parliament formed a parliamentary majority which repealed the language law on 23 February 2014. 42 […] Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine's own interest to ensure that these people's rights and interests are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine's state stability and territorial integrity".
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Two and a half years after the beginning of the events of Donbass and the Crimea, the Russian president stated his opinion that due to steps taken by the Ukrainian power, Russia "was forced to defend Russian-speaking population of Donbass". 45 Russia was not the only one that welcomed the abolition of the law with suspect. The Special Rapporteur of UN Stated: "Steps to Abolish the 2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy, although veto, created anxiety amongst some communities, Including ethnic Russians, will hurt minority language rights in fortress." 46 Temporarily filling the positions of both president and speaker of the parliament, Oleksandr Turchynov assessed the situation and decided, on 27 February not to sign the document that would have repealed the language law of 2012, which thus remained in force. It was too late for a decision, and the attempt of the abolition of the 2012 language law become the pretext of the newest and most serious crisis in Ukraine. The attempt of the abolition of the language law -when a few hundred meters away from the representatives voting on this in parliament, thousands protested, gunman looked at each other eye to eye, burned in fires -demonstrates how important and symbolic is the language issue in Ukraine. There are differences in literature concerning the question. According to Sakwa "the language issue was one of the main causes of the conflict that erupted in the eastern part of the country". 47 Drozda sees: "The present situation in Ukraine is an example of how can a linguistic and cultural war become a precondition and official principle of a real war."
48 At the same time Osnach states: "Wherever we look, the current Russian-Ukrainian war began because of the language. It is an indisputable fact. Russia has just used the language factor as a reason for aggression -by explaining that they need to protect the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine."
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The Language Policy and the Recent Crisis
Instead of suddenly abolishing the language law Turchynov made a proposal to develop a new language law. He stated that the draft of the new law to be completed within a short period of time, "taking into account the existing speculations regarding the language issue". Turchynov also added that the new, balanced Language Act "will take into account the eastern and western parts of Ukraine, the interests of all ethnic groups and national minorities". 50 The new language law has still not been born, but this step served to ease the tension, as the statement that prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk and Turchynov pledged on 18 April 2014, that the highly centralized state power will be decentralized and Russian will get a special status. 51 The parliament on 20 May voted the "Memorandum of Understanding and Peace", in relation to the languages in which says: "In parallel with the status of the Ukrainian language as a state language the Supreme Council of Ukraine guarantees the insurance of the status of Russian language. The government will also guarantee the support for the languages of national minorities in minority areas compactly. operation" -besides the country's extremely serious economic situation and unbalanced domestic politic -led to a severe crisis. The new president continued a conciliatory approach. On 28 June 2014 Petro Poroshenko expressed his hope: "I hope -Poroshenko said in a statement on 28 June 2014 -that in the history of Ukraine the issue of language or culture will never again threaten the national unity", thereby acknowledging that the unsettled language problem is a security risk for the state. Poroshenko in his post-election speech and in his New Year's made speech gestures towards the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. At one point in his speech he switched to Russian. He also stated that one can love Ukraine in Russian as much as in Ukrainian. He added that 62 % who fought for Ukraine in the east is Russian-speaking.
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The President was the supporter of a movement, which tried to reduce the tension in the country: the "Єдина країна -Единая страна" ("the single country" in Ukrainian and Russian) slogan was depicted on posters, billboards, leaflets, on national television, in the corner of video clips, it also has a dedicated page on the most popular social network site.
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This gives reason for nationalist intellectual circles to keep attacking the president. 55 One of the best known Kyiv based linguistics, Larysa Masenko stated the following in an internet portal where language related issues are discussed regularly: "The currently popular slogan 'Єдина країна -Единая страна' is faulty: it solidifies bilingualism on a country level, that is, it strengthens Russian as a second state language. In other words, it does not unify the country but divides it. By saying 'Единая страна' in Russian we turn to those living in the east and assert that Ukrainian, which is a special symbol of the unification of the nation, is not obligatory, even for the president, and with this we betray Ukrainians, primarily those living in the east, who are loyal to their language despite the constant pressure from the Russian speaking environment." 56 Shevchuk, a linguist teaching Ukrainian in the United States agrees: "The Ukrainian society has not only become a hostage" to the united and indivisible Russia's "imperial formula 'Єдина країна, Единая страна' which onfirms the Russification. With its resignation and conformism they take part in destroying their own language and culture". 57 Citing a metaphorical parallel between the inhabitants of Gilead and Ephraim of the biblical Book of Judges (112: 56), known for bloody conflicts (see now Shibboleth) and between the Ukrainian war, Shevchuk opposed the Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism for all kinds of manifestations: "The linguistic schizophrenia deprives the protective role from the Ukrainian language in the existential situations when your life is in danger, and based on your language you can distinguish ours from the enemy." 58 Masenko is suspiciously eyeing the Russian-speaking part of the Ukrainian society: "The victory in the linguistic and cultural war with Ukraine was a prerequisite for Russia in the current military intervention, and the occupation of Donbass and the Crimea. And planning the revitalization of the Soviet empire, the Kremlin is counting on those parts of the Ukrainian population which could be 'crystallized' by the control of the mass media."
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Many consider that the sacrifice made by Russian native speakers on the front line for Ukraine is not enough. A Ukrainian writer Matsyuk explains in one of the entries in a language policy portal on Russian-speaking people fighting against separatists "somehow we should make them believe, that their Moscow language is their personal sin against Ukraine [...] against the Ukraine, for which, literally, they shed their blood". According to him, the Russian-speaking Ukrainians also have to be convinced that the Russian language in Ukraine does not worth the blood sacrifice. And then he asks the question: [the Russian-speaking Ukrainians] "when will they leave the Russian speech which has only been their mother tongue since the second generation? This will be the redemption of their original sin, which is more expensive for Ukraine than their blood".
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The battlefield sacrifice of the Russian-speaking is being reduced by sociological research. For example, a survey published 6 June 2016, points out that among the participants of the ATO 73 % is of Ukrainian mother tongue, 6 % of Russian and 19 % of the Ukrainian-Russian-speaking rate; however, among those informants who are not involved in the ATO, only 55 % is the proportion of native speakers of the Ukrainians, 19 % is Russian-speaking and 23 % is bilingual. So there is a bigger proportion of the Ukrainian-speakers in the ATO than amongst those who are not involved in the fights. Civil movements are protesting against the missing Ukrainian nationalization. On the 9th of November 2015 a movement in front of the presidential office announced claims to provide special status of the Ukrainian language, the motto was "Ukrainization -resistance against the occupation". 64 "The [...] language law was written on Putin's knee, and had a different purpose. The president keeps talking about the protection of the Ukrainian language, but nothing happens. We are tired of demagoguery. A war is going on here, the Russian propaganda pours from the screen, and no one does anything about it" -said one of the protesters. 65 Extension of the scope of use of the Ukrainian language, the obstruction of the Russian language is considered by many as a split from the colonial past Soviet era and means freedom and independence. According to Masenko, "the Russian language is the chain that bounds Ukraine to the Communist past". 66 At the 25 th anniversary of the Ukrainian independence scheduled for 24 August 2016 a nationwide campaign of young people was announced, the slogan was: "Be truly independent: speak Ukrainian!" 67 
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the crisis in Ukraine and the language problems are connected by multiple threads. In the only 25-year history, the country has faced various crises. In the domestic political crises the language issue was constantly present: the political elite used the language issue as a mobilizing force for the election mood-enhancing factor to their own use. The language issue could become a division factor instead of a cohesion factor for a nation that is seeking identity after the collapse of the Soviet system. As a result of the misguided language policy in the tense political situation the language issue became a pretext for military intervention, it has become a casus belli. In the conflict of the increased Russian nationalism and the growing Ukrainian nationalism the language plays a central role. In response to the circumstances of the Ukrainian crisis, the Kyiv government is trying to develop a language policy that reduces social division and tension and towards both sides (native speakers of Ukrainian and Russian speakers). However, the Ukrainian nationalism sees Russian language as the aggressor, as the enemy's language and the spread of the Ukrainian language is connected to the country's independence, winning the war in the east and the independence. Simultaneously, however, the imperial nationalism in Russia, apparently for state-supported shows on the Ukrainian nationalism as a response to the annexation of the Crimea and the military intervention into Ukrainian territory. Ukraine today is a state that has been in a transitional period since the proclamation of its independence twenty-five years ago: it seeks the leaven, which can be the basis for a new national identity. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian language policy did not contribute to this search and could not come up with valid solutions for the crisis. However aftermath of the Crisis the currently bilingual country can become monolingual gradually.
